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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. ] 
TONY EMERSON, 
Defendant-Appellant.) 
• Case No. 920744-CA 
( (Priority 11) 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court's jurisdiction is based on Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-
3(2) (d) and (3), (1953, as amended 1992). A minute entry was 
entered on December 4th, 1992, granting Emerson's petition for 
interlocutory review. A copy of the minute entry is contained in 
Addendum A of Appellant's brief. 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The City relies on the following statutes: 
I. Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.3 Standards for chemical breath 
analysis- Evidence. 
(1) The commissioner of the Department of Public Safety shall 
establish standards for the administration of and interpretation of 
chemical analysis of a person's breath, including standards of 
training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to 
prove that a person was operating or in actual physical control of 
a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or 
operating with a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily 
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prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of acts, 
conditions or events to prove that the analysis was made and the 
instrument used was accurate, according to standards established in 
Subsection (1), are admissible if: 
(a) the judge finds they were made in the regular 
course of the investigation at or about the time of 
the act and, condition or event; and 
(b) the source of information from which made and 
the method and circumstance of their preparation 
indicate their trustworthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under 
Subsection (1) and the conditions of Subsection (2) have been met, 
there is a presumption that the test results are valid and further 
foundation for introduction of the evidence is unnecessary. 
II. Utah Admin. R735-500-6D(2). 
Written checklists, outlining the method of properly 
performing breath tests shall be available at each location where 
tests are given. Test record cards used in conjunction with breath 
testing shall be available at each location where tests are given. 
Both the checklist and test record card, after completion of a test 
should be retained by the operator. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Whether the statutes or administrative regulations of the 
State of Utah require the completion of a checklist as a condition 
of admissibility of a breath test? 
II. Whether the failure to retain test record cards from two 
attempted tests renders a subsequent completed test inadmissible? 
The issues presented in this appeal are questions of law, 
specifically, questions concerning the admissibility of evidence. 
Therefore, the appropriate standard is a "correctness" standard. 
State v. Ramirez, 813 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The City accepts the Statement of the case and the Nature of 
the proceedings as stated in the Brief of Defendant/Appellant, with 
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one exception. The City would submit that the Prosecutor, at the 
hearing on Emerson's motion to suppress, argued that the failure to 
complete a checklist is of no consequence to admissibility, not 
that failure to follow the checklist is of no consequence. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The statutes and the regulations of the State of Utah do not 
require the completion of a checklist as a condition of 
admissibility of a breath test. The plain language of the 
applicable statutes shows that such a requirement is not 
contemplated by the law. 
An Officer's failure to retain the test record cards from two 
attempted, but not completed, tests is not a violation of a 
suspect's due process rights and there is no statutory authority 
that requires the retention of such test record cards. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. UTAH LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE THE PREPARATION OF A CHECKLIST AS A 
PREREQUISITE TO ADMISSIBILITY OF A BREATH TEST. 
Preliminary questions concerning the admissibility of evidence 
are within the sound discretion of the court, although the 
relevancy of evidence may be conditioned upon the existence of 
facts. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 104. Statutory provisions 
dealing with the admissibility of chemical tests are contained 
within Utah's DUI statutes in Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.3 (1953, as 
amended, 1987) . Since the City was able to supply the proper 
factual basis through the testimony of Officer Hatch, the breath 
test administered to the Appellant, Emerson, is admissible. 
A. Utah Administrative Rule R735-500-6 does not require the 
preparation of a checklist as a prerequisite to 
admissibility of a breath test. 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.3 states: 
(1) The commissioner of the Department of Public 
Safety shall establish standards for the administration 
of and interpretation of chemical analysis of a person's 
breath, including standards of training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is 
material to prove that a person was operating or in 
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol or any drug or operating with a 
blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited, 
documents offered as memoranda or records of acts, 
conditions or events to prove that the analysis was made 
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and the instrument used was accurate, according to 
standards established in Subsection (1), are admissible 
if: 
(a) the judge finds they were made in the 
regular course of the investigation at or 
about the time of the act, condition or event; 
and 
(b) the source of information from which made 
and the method and circumstance of their 
preparation indicate their trustworthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards 
established under Subsection (1) and the conditions of 
Subsection (2) have been met, there is a presumption that 
the test results are valid and further foundation for 
introduction of the evidence is unnecessary. 
Pursuant to Subsection (1) of §41-6-44.3, the Department of 
Public Safety established Utah Administrative Rule R735-500-61, 
titled "Program certification." This rule requires that for a 
breath testing program to be certified, it must meet certain 
criteria. Specifically, it requires that "[w]ritten checklists 
outlining the method of properly performing breath test shall be 
available at each location where tests are given." Utah Admin. 
R735-500-6D(2). 
The plain language of R735-500-6D(2) shows that this section 
does not contemplate the preparation of a checklist as a 
prerequisite to admissibility of a breath test. In R735-500-6D(2) 
the word "shall11 is used to require that checklists and breath test 
result cards be available. The regulation then states that the 
checklist and test record card "should" be retained by the Officer, 
after completion of a test. Elementary rules of statutory 
1
 At the time of Emerson's arrest, the breath testing 
regulations promulgated by the Department of Public Safety were 
found in Utah Administrative Code R735-500. In the new version of 
the Administrative Code, the regulations are found at R714-500. 
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construction require that when different language is used in 
different parts of a statute, it is to be presumed that the 
language is used with a different intent. 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes 
§235 (1973) . The use of "shall" is obviously mandatory in this 
section of the Regulations. The use of "should" is not mandatory. 
If the regulation had been intended to require retention of the 
checklist, the mandatory "shall" would have been used. From the 
fact that "should" is used in speaking of retention of the 
checklist and test result card, it can be deduced that the 
regulations do not require the retention of any document. The City 
acknowledges that retention of the result card and checklist is the 
better method and certainly suggested by the regulations, but the 
only requirement of the regulations is that the checklists and 
result cards be available. 
B. The statutory structure of Utah's DUI law and the case 
law interpreting those statutes does not require the 
preparation of a checklist as a prerequisite to 
admissibility of a breath test. 
There is no language, explicit or implied in Utah Code Ann. 
§41-6-44.3 that requires the preparation of a checklist to lay 
foundation for the admissibility of the breath test. Subsection 
(2) of §41-6-44.3 refers to "documents offered as memoranda or 
records of acts, conditions, or events to prove that the analysis 
was made and the instrument used was accurate." This section of 
§41-6-44.3 refers specifically to affidavits of public officers 
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responsible for the regular testing of the breath testing machines 
for accuracy. Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (1983) . 
In Murray City, the Supreme Court of this state considered 
§41-6-44.3 in relation to a claim that results of a breathalyzer 
were admitted in a trial without proper foundation. Interpreting 
the statute, the court found that: 
[t]he enactment of §41-6-44.3 evinces an intent by the 
Legislature to relieve the State of Utah and other 
governmental entities of the financial burden of calling 
as a witness in every DUI case the public officer 
responsible for testing the accuracy of the breathalyzer 
equipment. 
Murray City at 1320. 
Even if this court were to find that the language of §41-6-
44.3 relates to the preparation of checklists and result cards, the 
language of Subsection (3) clearly shows that the failure to have 
a checklist does not make test results inadmissible. Subsection 
(3) states that " [i]f the judge finds the ... conditions of 
Subsection (2) have been met, there is a presumption that the test 
results are valid and further foundation for introduction of the 
evidence is unnecessary." Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.3(3) (Emphasis 
added). By specifically noting that "further foundation is 
unnecessary" if Subsection (2) is satisfied, the statute 
contemplates that in those instances where Subsection (2) is not 
met, further foundation may be required, as opposed to rendering 
the evidence inadmissible. Thus, upon proper foundation, 
(testimony indicating that the test was properly administered) , the 
test results would still be admissible. 
Emerson argues that failure to fill out a checklist cannot be 
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cured by the Officer's testimony that the steps on the checklist 
were followed. Emerson cites law from Texas and Hawaii in support 
of this proposition. Utah law is contrary to Emerson's position. 
In In Interest of Oaks, 571 P.2d 1364 (1977) , the Utah Supreme 
Court dealt with a very similar issue. A minor, Oaks, was arrested 
for DUI and given a breathalyzer test. On the result card the 
Officer administering the test had failed to fill in the blanks 
identifying the machine and the ampoule used in the test. Oaks 
claimed that the failure to note these numbers was error. The 
Court held that ,f[t]he omission of the number of the machine or of 
the ampoule on the test card would not make the testimony of the 
expert incompetent.11 Oaks at 1365. Likewise, Officer Hatch's 
failure to completely fill in the test record or to use separate 
checklists for each attempted test does not make his testimony 
incompetent. 
Additionally, the cases Emerson cites in support of his 
argument that the alleged deficiencies cannot be cured by testimony 
of the Officer do not stand for the cited proposition. I n 
State v. Kost, 785 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1990), the 
court dealt with a situation where a breath test result was 
challenged based on the failure of the State's witness to observe 
all of the requirements of the Department of Public Safety 
regulations. The testimony of the state's witness was that he did 
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not follow the regulations2 as they were currently stated in the 
Texas Administrative Code, but that the "Scientific Director" of 
the State Department of Public Health had changed those 
requirements, even though such change was not noted in the Texas 
Administrative Code. The Court held that the "Scientific Director" 
did not have the authority to alter the regulations and the 
Administrative Code, and that any directive making such change was 
not presented in evidence. For this reason, the results of the 
test were suppressed. 
The issue before the court was not whether testimony could 
cure the defect, but whether the changes alleged were authorized 
under law. Kost is not applicable to Emerson's situation. 
Also cited by Emerson is State v. Rolison, 733 P.2d 326 
(Hawaii App. 1987). In Rolison, the issue presented to the court 
dealt with the state's failure to present evidence concerning the 
regular testing for accuracy of the machine in use. The court held 
that because there was no evidence of such testing presented, 
foundation was improper. Rolison did not address the issue of 
whether a failure to follow the regulations could be cured by 
testimony, because the state never attempted to introduce any 
evidence on the question of testing for accuracy. As such, Rolison 
2
 It is interesting to note that the Texas statutory DUI 
scheme differs from Utah's in that TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 
67011-5, §3(b), (the counterpart of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.3), 
specifically requires that "[a]nalysis of a specimen of a person's 
breath, to be considered valid under the provisions of this 
section, must be performed according to rules of the Texas 
Department of Public Safety ... . Thus, Texas law specifically 
requires compliance with the state's administrative code for the 
results of a test to admissible in evidence. 
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is not applicable to Emerson's situation. 
It is interesting to note that in Rolison, the state argued 
that the test result was admissible despite the failure to present 
evidence regarding the testing of the machines because a checklist 
was followed. The Court noted that the checklist was not required 
by the regulations of the state, but was a creation of the Honolulu 
Police Department. 
The state cited an Alaska case, State v. Oveson, 574 P.2d 801 
(Alaska 1978), for the proposition that a checklist was sufficient 
to establish foundation for the breath test. The Rolison court 
found Oveson inapposite because the regulations of Alaska differ 
from those of Hawaii. 
The Alaska regulations stated !f[t]he procedures set forth in 
this section shall be followed to obtain and analyze breath samples 
by use of the Borkenstein Breathalyzer. 
(1) complete the 'Breathalyzer Operational Checklist' 
form ... ." 
Oveson at 804 fn 7. 
The facts of Oveson are also of interest in Emerson's case. 
In Oveson a person arrested for DUI was given a breath test. As 
noted above, Alaska law requires the preparation of an operational 
checklist as a condition of a valid test. In Oveson, the 
checklist was filled out, but one box was left blank. The Officer 
who administered the test testified that he completed that step, 
but forgot to check the box. The court denied defendant's motion 
to dismiss for failure to complete the checklist. The sole issue 
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on appeal was the failure to complete the checklist. The Alaska 
Supreme Court held that despite the mandatory statutory language, 
the non-compliance with regulatory standards could be cured by 
testimony. The court noted that compliance would have entitled the 
City to a presumption of validity in their test, but that 
noncompliance did not result in inadmissibility. Oveson at 805. 
In Emerson's case there is testimony that the steps on the 
checklist were followed, and, contrary to Alaska law, the 
completion of a checklist is not required by the regulations or 
statutes of Utah. As such, Officer Hatch's failure to complete a 
checklist for all three attempted tests does not affect the 
admissibility of the completed test. 
Emerson also cites State v. Vigil, 772 P.2d 469 (Utah App. 
1989) for the proposition that the City must demonstrate compliance 
with regulatory standards or the breath test is invalid. Vigil, 
like Murray City, supra, examined the requirement in the 
regulations relating to the periodic testing of the breath test 
machines for accuracy. The specific issue in Viail was whether the 
prosecution was required to establish "bookends" for the test; i.e. 
whether or not the breath test machine must be checked both before 
and after the defendant's test to meet foundational requirements. 
The Vigil court held that "bookends" were not necessary, following 
the literal language of the regulations and refusing to impose a 
requirement which was not written into the regulations by the 
Department of Public Safety. 
What is required by R735-500-6D(2) is that checklists, which 
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"outline the method of properly performing breath tests," be 
available at the testing location. That they were available at the 
testing point in Emerson's case is evidenced by the fact that a 
completed checklist was introduced into evidence at the hearing on 
Emerson's motion to suppress. 
In summary, it is clear that the law of Utah does not require 
the preparation of a checklist as a condition of admissibility of 
the breath test. 
II. THE FAILURE TO MAINTAIN THE RESULT CARDS FROM THE "DEFICIENT 
SAMPLE" ATTEMPTED TESTS DOES NOT REQUIRE SUPPRESSION OF THE 
COMPLETED TEST AND IS NOT ERROR. 
A police officer has no obligation to help a criminal suspect 
gather exculpatory evidence, absent a statutorily or 
constitutionally imposed duty. Layton City v. Watson, 733 P.2d 499 
(Utah 1987). In the present case, no statute requires that Officer 
Hatch preserve the test cards from the attempted tests, and the 
failure to maintain the test cards does not violate Emerson's Due 
Process rights. Therefore, the results of the completed breath 
test are not inadmissible. 
A. The Utah Administrative Code, Rule 735-500-6D(2), 
does not require that the result cards from the attempted 
test be maintained as a condition of admissibility of the 
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completed test. 
Utah Admin. R735-500-6D(2) states: 
[w]ritten checklists, outlining the method of properly 
performing breath tests shall be available at each 
location where tests are given. Test record cards used 
in conjunction with breath testing shall be available at 
each location where tests are given. Both the checklist 
and test record card, after completion of a test should 
be retained by the operator. 
Emphasis added. 
As noted in Section I, above, elementary rules of statutory 
construction require that where different language is used in 
different parts of a statute, it is to be presumed that the 
language is used with a different intent. 73 Am. Jur. 2d §235. In 
this particular situation, the use of "shall" and "should" shows 
obviously distinct intent. "Shall" is a mandatory directive, while 
should is suggestive. Had the Department of Public Safety intended 
that retention of the checklists be mandatory, "shall," could have 
been used instead of "should." The use of a different term must be 
given affect. 
It is also an elementary rule of statutory construction that 
a legislative body uses each term in a statute advisedly, and that 
each part of a statute has a purpose and should be interpreted 
accordingly. 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes §250 (1973) . "Test" is 
defined by Websters Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary as "a critical 
examination, observation, or evaluation." The plain language of 
R735-500-6D(2) states that the test record card, "after completion 
of a test should be retained." Emphasis added. In Emerson's 
case, there were apparently two attempted tests before a valid test 
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was completed. Testimony from Officer Hatch at the hearing on the 
motion to suppress indicated that the first two attempts were 
unsuccessful in that defendant failed to sustain a long enough 
breath for the machine to perform any analysis. (R. 29-31) . From 
the definition of "test" given above, it would seem clear that for 
a test to take place, there must be some specimen to be examined, 
observed or evaluated. In Emerson's case, there was no such 
specimen obtained on the first two attempts because Emerson did not 
provide enough breath for the machine to analyze. The plain 
language of the regulation suggests retention of the test card only 
upon "completion" of a test. The first two attempts at a test with 
Mr. Emerson did not result in completed tests. Therefore, even if 
the court were to go beyond the plain language of the regulations 
and require retention of the result card, Officer Hatch would not 
be required to maintain the cards from the first two incomplete 
tests. The third card, from the completed test was retained by the 
Officer, and is available for inspection. 
B. There is no constitutional duty to preserve the 
cards from the first two attempted tests, and the failure 
of Officer Hatch to retain those cards is not error. 
Whatever duty the Constitution imposes on States and 
prosecution agencies to preserve evidence, that duty is limited to 
evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the 
suspect's defense. To meet a constitutional standard of 
materiality, evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that 
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was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a 
nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable 
evidence by other reasonably available means. California v. 
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed. 2d 413 (1984), 
Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 
(1988) . The test cards from the attempted tests in Emerson's case 
have no apparent exculpatory value, and either party present during 
the attempted tests has the opportunity to present evidence through 
testimony concerning the events. 
In his brief, Emerson has made no attempt to characterize the 
attempted test cards as exculpatory. Instead, he speaks only of 
the safeguard of preserving the evidence so that it might be 
reviewed by an expert for "irregularities or exculpatory results." 
Brief of Appellant at p. 10. Youngblood dealt with a situation 
where the evidentiary value of the lost evidence was unknown. In 
Youngblood, the defendant was convicted of child molestation, 
sexual assault and kidnapping. The state failed to preserve semen 
samples from the victim's body and clothing. The Court held that 
unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the 
police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not 
constitute a denial of due process of law. Youngblood at 58, 109 
S.Ct. at 337. (Emphasis added). 
In a situation more on point with Emerson's case, the Supreme 
Court of the State of Washington dealt with a similar issue in 
State v. Straka, 810 P.2d 888 (Wash. 1991). In Straka, similarly 
situated defendants argued that their due process rights were 
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violated when the state failed to preserve "invalid sample" 
messages which appeared on the breath test machine screen. The 
evidence showed that an inordinately high number of such messages 
were appearing on machines and in the State's data base which 
recorded all tests taken. 
Defendant's argued that the evidence at issue was not unknown 
or speculative evidence which might conceivably be of significance, 
but was actual evidence that the prosecution's only evidence of 
breath alcohol was inaccurate, and thus, Younablood did not apply. 
Straka at 900. The court disagreed with defendants' argument, 
noting: 
[t]he invalid sample messages are not directly related to 
guilt or innocence. Their relationship is tangential at 
best in that, as defendants acknowledge, any record of 
occurrences would be used in an attempt to discredit the 
reliability of breath test results. Any record of 
invalid sample occurrences could not directly serve to 
confirm or deny particular breath test results. 
Straka at 901. 
Likewise, the attempted test cards in Emerson's case are not 
exculpatory. They could only be used to discredit the machine, not 
to confirm or deny particular breath results. Additionally the 
City's ability to show that the machine was in proper working order 
at the time of Emerson's test has not been called into question. 
Finally, even if the court were to find that preservation of 
the attempted test cards were constitutionally or statutorily 
required, the proper remedy would be suppression of the evidence 
concerning the attempted tests, not suppression of the completed 
tests. The foundation for the completed test should not be in 
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question. Requiring suppression of the completed test would lead 
to a result which prohibited an officer from retaking a test to 
cure a mistake or deficiency in the first attempt. Such a result 
is clearly not reasonable and is not contemplated by law. 
CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the City requests 
that defendant's appeal should be denied, and the ruling of the 
trial court affirmed, with the case remanded for trial on the 
merits. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ f^ILrday of May, 1993. 
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I, Todd J. Godfrey, hereby certify that I have caused eight 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to be delivered to the 
Utah Court of Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84102, and four copies to J. Franklin All red, 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant, 321 South 600 East, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84102, on this /Pft- day of May, 1993. 
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complied /ith in the creation of the test. 
WHEf TORE, the Defendant prays that the sam» be i: -p )ressed. 
DATI ) this JS2^r dav 
/J. FRANKLIN AI LRED / 
Attorney for \ ne De "e,idant 
*;o,,"T rv NOTI
:\ T:fM :;:..; :NT:rr AL::\*E NAMED AND TO IT»S ATTORNEY CHEF L LUKE: 
You ; p.ci each cl you will please Notice that the e1endantfs 
Metier, to S'dpccess the breath test evidence w 11 c :TH on for 
rearing be tore the honorable Judge Sheila McCleve, in hp • Courtroom 
in the Third Circuit Court Salt Lake Department or Tues .a\ , August 
25, 1992, at the hour of 2:00 p.m. Of the foregoing, lease take 
notice arc govern '/ourselves accordingly. 
DATE: t h i s yOA— day cf J u l y , I99_2. 
s s. 
J/franklin Al Lr 
Attorney for t le 
ed 
De erdant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of th • + cregoing 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AND NOTICE OF KEAFENG, v* 5 mailed 
postage prepaid to: 
Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office 
221 Last 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111 
DATE:» this cg*? a ay of July, 19 
«. . r.vJ'.",-iIJ nwi_r.^lJ, P.C. *A005o 
Attorney fcr Defendant 
:;.: scut:-, ec: E^t 
Salt Lai-'.e City, utan 84 102 
Tulosr.cr .e: (-C1) 521-199C 
FILED 
OCT 2 0 1592 
y THE THIRD CIRCUIT, CCUR: * ;I /-i. t ^  r u :\ SALT , : 's.wj.i:i 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
vs . 
:laintif f, 
CRC::? ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
ret 
'udce Sheila McCleve 
Case No. 9 2 5014647TC 
The Motion of -he Defendant above nar.ed to suppress the breath 
test evidence in the above entitled case cane en regularly for 
hearing before tru Honorable Sheila MtCleve in her courtroom in 
the Salt Lake Circuit en Tuesday, August 25, 1992, at the hour of 
2: CO p.r.. testimony was received and counsel argued> their 
respective positions and having rested and the Court being fully 
advised and having consider the matter, now therefore, makes the 
^ f* * ^ r^i • * ••* r* Pi v ^ a >* • 
CRTI?. 
The Motion of the Defendant to Suocress the Evidence is 
denied. 
DATED this zo -4-day of October, 1992. 
BY^THE COURT 
c 
<-*_ 
Sheila McCleve 
ICtfcuit Court Judae 
I hereby -cer t i fy t h a t a t rue ar: c o r r e c t copy of the foregoing 
CREEP., was r .ai ied postage prepaid t.c : 
Q •» • <-«-» T 1 
£*nn , i r, 
. I S 
: PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
SOUTH 
. I . w - nT. C h i l l 
